

# **Programme** THE 14th MIICEMA CONFERENCE

MALAYSIA-INDONESIA INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS. MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING

# **ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Issues and Challenges**

IPB International Convention Center (IICC) Botani Square, Bogor, West Java - Indonesia

> Wednesday - Thursday October 9 - 10, 2013



Organized by:

**Faculty of Economics and Management Bogor Agricultural University** 

























































# THE 14th MIICEMA CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

DAY 1st Wednesday, October 9

	ricallesauy, Sciobel s	
08.00-09.00	REGISTRATION AND MORNING TEA	Lobby IICC
09.00-10.00	OPENING SESSION	
09.00-09.10	Welcome Remarks: Dean of Faculty of Economics and Management IPB Dr. Yusman Syaukat	
09.10-09.20	Message: MIICEMA Coordinator Prof. Dr. Nor Ghani Md Nor (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia)	
09.20-09.30	Message: Dean and Departmental Chair Forum of the State University Council of the Western Indonesia Region Coordinator Dr. Ridwan Nurazi (University of Bengkulu)	
09.30-10.00	Opening Remarks and Soft Launching of <b>ASEAN Journal f Economics, Management &amp; Accounting</b> Rector of IPB <i>Prof. Dr. Herry Suhardiyanto</i>	Ballroom 2 IICC
10.00-12.00	PLENARY SESSION	
10.00-10.45	Keynote Address: Vice Minister of Trade, Republic of Indonesia Dr. Bayu Krisnamurthi	
10.45-11.30	Invited Speaker: Indonesian Ambassador for Thailand H.E. Mr. Lutfi Rauf	
11.30-12.00	Invited Speaker: National University of Malaysia Prof. Dr. Jamal Othman (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia)	
12.00-13.00	LUNCH BREAK	Lobby IICC
13.00-14.30	PARALLEL SESSIONS Room: BARANANGSIAN	G CAMPUS
	Economics and Trade Moderator: <i>Dr. Sahara</i>	Mawar
	Accounting And Finance Moderator: <i>Dr. Abdul Kohar</i>	Melati
	Human Resources Management Moderator: <i>Dr Ir Lukman M.Baga, MEc</i>	Cempaka
	Knowledge and Management Innovation Moderator: <i>Dr Ir Suharno, MADev</i>	Kenanga
14.30-14.45	Shift	
	<u> </u>	



14.45-16.00	PARALLEL SESSIONS Room: BARANANGSIAN	IC CAMPLIS					
14.45-10.00		IG CANVII 05					
	Economics and Trade	Mawar					
	Moderator: Dr. Harya Kuncara, SE, M.Si						
	Accounting And Finance	Melati					
	Moderator: Dr. Amzul Rifin						
	Human Resources Management	Cempaka					
	Moderator: Dr Ir Lukman M.Baga, MEc	- · ·					
	Knowledge and Management Innovation						
	Moderator: Dr Ir Suharno, MADev	Kenanga					
16.00-16.30	Coffee Break, Prayer						
16.30-18.00	PARALLEL SESSIONS Room: BARANANGSIAN	G CAMPUS					
	Consumer Behavior	Vonanga					
	Moderator: Dr. Mukhamad Najib	Kenanga					
	Sharia Economics And Finance	Compoleo					
	Moderator: Dr Ir Lukman M.Baga, MEc	Cempaka					
	Agribusiness and Entrepreneurship	3.6.1.0					
	Moderator: Dr. Andriyono Kilat Adhi	Melati					
	Graduate Student Forum						
	Moderator: Dr. Sahara	Mawar					
19.00-22.00	WELCOME DINNER Room: BALLROOM 2 IICC						

## DAY 2<sup>nd</sup> Thursday, October 10

08.00-10.00	PARALLEL SESSIONS Room: BARANANGSIANG CA							
	Economic and Trade Moderator: <i>Dr. Aceng Hidayat</i>	Kenanga						
	Sharia Economic And Finance Moderator: <i>Dr. Dedi Budiman Hakim</i>	Cempaka						
	Agribusiness and Entrepreneurship Moderator: <i>Dr. Netti Tinaprila</i>	Melati						
	Graduate Student Forum Moderator: <i>Dr. Jono M. Munandar</i>	Mawar						
10.00-10.30	Break							
10.30-12.00	Keynote Speech from the Chairman of National Economic Committee (Komite Ekonomi Nasional) Indonesia, <i>Dr. Chairul Tanjung</i> Moderator: <i>Prof. Dr. Hermanto Siregar</i>	Ballroom 2 IICC						
12.00-13.30	Closing Ceremony and Lunch Break							
14.00-16.00	Fieldtrip to Bogor Palace							
16.00-18.00	Fieldtrip to SKI							

# SUB THEME ECONOMIC AND TRADE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: MAWAR TIME: 13.00-14.30 PM

# MODERATOR *Dr. Sahara*

- 1. THE MACROECONOMIC CAUSE OF STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY: EMPIRICAL STUDY BASED ON MALAYSIAN AND INDONESIAN DATA Lida Nikmanesh, Abu Hassan Shaari Md Nor and Tamat Sarmidi
- RESOURCE CURSE, ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Tamat Sarmidi, Yaghoob Jafaria, Abu Hassan Shaari Md Noor
- 3. OIL PRICE SHOCK AND THE ROLE OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY ON INDONESIAN STOCK MARKET: A SIGN RESTRICTION VAR ANALYSIS Rossanto Dwi Handoyo, Mansor Jusoh, Mohd. Azlan Shah Zaidi
- 4. INCOME DIFFERENCES AND INTRA INDUSTRY TRADE AMONG ASEAN COUNTRIES
  Amzul Rifin
- ANOMALY OF CAPITAL MARKET: PUBLIC HOLIDAYS AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS
   Danang Adi Putra, Eddy Suranta, Rini Indriani
- 6. THE INVESTIGATION OF FUNDAMENTAL EFFECTS, INTEREST RATE, EXCHANGE RATE AND INFLATION ON STOCK RETURN OF BANKING SECTOR IN INDONESIA STOCK EXCHANGE Ridwan Nurazi

# SUB THEME ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: MELATI TIME: 13.00-14.30 PM

# MODERATOR **Dr. Abdul Kohar**

- 7. THE ANALYSIS OF BEARISH AND BULLISH BY USING CANDLESTICK ANALYSIS

  Berto Usman
- 8. LEVERAGE AND CORPORATE DEMAND FOR INSURANCE IN MALAYSIA Mohamad Abdul Hamid
- EFFECT OF PROFITABILITY AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET OF CASH DIVIDEND POLICY WITH THE LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE Ayu Martazela, Fenny Marietza, Pratana Puspa Midiastuty
- 10. INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN BOARD MEMBERSHIP, BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP TO FIRM VALUE (EMPIRICAL STUDY ON MANUFACTURING COMPANY LISTED AT BEI YEAR OF 2009-2011) Nikmah, Fitrawati Ilyas, Sigit Arifianto
- 11. THE EFFECT OF UNDERSTANDING OF TAX ACCOUNTING, SERVICE QUALITY OF TAX OFFICERS, AWARENESS OF TAXPAYERS AND TRANSPARENCY IN TAXATION TOWARD OBEDIENCE OF CORPORATE TAXPAYERS IN BENGKULU CITY Sriwidharmanely, Darman Usman, Emilda Sulastri
- 12. DOES INCOME GAP MATTERS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD DEBT ACCUMULATION?

Mohd Afzanizam Abdul Rashid, Tamat Sarmidi, Nor Ghani Md Nor, Abu Hassan Shaari Md Noor

# SUB THEME HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: CEMPAKA TIME: 13.00-14.30 PM

# MODERATOR Dr. Ir. Lukman M.Baga, MEc

13. THE INFLUENCES OF LEADERSHIP ROLE, MOTIVATION AND EMPLOYEES COMMITMENT TOWARD EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND THE ENERGY OF NORTH BENGKULU DISTRICT

Praningrum, Melva Hero, and Syaiful Anwar

- 14. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP CHARACTERISTIC, ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT, AND JOB SATISFACTION OF THE EMPLOYEES OF FOUR STATE-OWNED BANKS IN PONTIANAK, WEST KALIMANTAN IIzar Daud
- 15. COMPREHENSIVE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS AS A PROCESS OF ROLE CLARITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EMPOWERMENT: HOW THEY CAN REDUCE JOB TENSION AND IMPROVE MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE

Fransiskus E. Daromes

- 16. MODEL OF SMES PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND SOCIAL CAPITAL Anggraini Sukmawati, Lindawati Kartika, M. Sjamsun, Fauzan
- 17. EFFECT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, CEILING BUDGET, AND THE QUALITY OF REGULATION CHANGES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVINCIAL BUDGET BENGKULU

Lismawati, Dita Try Maliza

18. THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT ON RELATION BETWEEN BUDGET PARTICIPATION AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE Isma Coryanata

# SUB THEME KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT INNOVATION

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: KENANGA TIME: 13.00-14.30 PM

# MODERATOR Dr. Ir. Suharno, MADev

- 19. ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM ACCRUAL MODELS Wiyadi and Sutanta
- 20. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM AND EARNING MANAGEMENT WITH INTEGRATED MODEL
  Rina Trisnawati, Suleksi Ekawati
- 21. THE IMPACT OF HOMESTAY TOURISM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM TO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY: A CASE STUDY OF HOMESTAY IN JOHOR Othman R; Salleh, N.H.M; Mohd Idris, S.H; Naufal, M
- 22. THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
  Willy Abdillah, Ferry Tema Atmaja, Effed Darta Hadi, Susri Adeni
- 23. THE IMPACT OF SERVICE ORIENTATION ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
  Lizar Alfansi, Ferry Tema Atmaja, Fachri Eka Saputra, Effed Darta Hadi

# SUB THEME **ECONOMIC AND TRADE**

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: MAWAR TIME: 14.45-16.00 PM

# MODERATOR Dr. Harya Kuncara, SE, M.Si

24. AGRO INDUSTRY DOWNSTREAMING THROUGH TAX EXPORT AND PRODUCTIVITY INCREMENT POLICIES ON PRIMARY EXPORT COMMODITIES

Lestari Agusalim, Rina Oktaviani, Lukytawati Anggraeni

25. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF ASEAN+3 COUNTRIES AND THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Manda Khairatul Aulia, Wiwiek Rindayati

- 26. THE INFLUENCES OF EXPENDITURE DEVELOPMENT AND LABOR FORCE TO THE ECONOMICS GROWTH IN BENGKULU PROVINCE Handoko Hadiyanto
- 27. ANALYSIS OF THE SRAGEN MUNICIPALITY GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

Agung Riyardi, Widojono, Muzakar Isa

- 28. FOREIGN SHOCKS, MONETARY POLICY, AND MACROECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY: A SVAR STUDY OF MALAYSIA
  - Zulkefly Abdul Karim
- 29. VOLATILITY OF FOOD PRICE AND ITS INFLUENCING FACTORS IN INDONESIA

Arini Hardjanto, Yusman Syaukat, Bonar M. Sinaga

# SUB THEME ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: MELATI TIME: 14.45-16.00 PM

# MODERATOR **Dr. Amzul Rifin**

- 30. ACCOUNTABILITY CAMPAIGN FUNDS: EFFECT OF THE LEVEL OF PUBLIK UNDERSTANDING AND POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERS ON ACCOUNTABILITY (STUDY OF PERCEPTION KPU AND PANWASLU IN BENGKULU CITY)
  - Fachruzzaman, Morry Putrado
- 31. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LKPD OBTAINING WTP OPINION, AND CAUSE CONTROVERSY DECISION IN THE PROVINCE BENGKULU
  - Kamaludin, Fachruzaman
- 32. THE EFFECT OF REPUTATION, ETHICS AND SELF ESTEEM ON BUDGETARY SLACK WITH LOCUS OF CONTROL AS A MODERATING VARIABLE Lisa Martiah Nila Puspita, Etika Yessianti
- 33. THE EFFECT OF FIRM SIZE, DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO TO PROFITABILITY WITH EARNINGS GROWTH AS MODERATING VARIABLE ON THE FIRM OF REAL ESTATE LISTED IN INDONESIA STOCK EXCHANGE Danang Adi Putra, Madani Hatta, Pratana Puspa Midiastuty
- 34. ANALYSIS RELATED EARNINGS OF GENUINESS AREA, TRANSFER OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BY INDEPENDENCE AREA THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS IN PROVINCE BENGKULU Fachruzzaman, Ahmad Fajri Afrendi

# SUB THEME HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: CEMPAKA TIME: 14.45-16.00 PM

# MODERATOR Dr. Ir. Lukman M. Baga, MEc

- 35. ADMINISTRATOR'S ROLE IN TRAINING PROGRAMS AS AN ANTECEDENT OF TRAINING TRANSFER Azman Ismail, Ng KuehHua
- 36. PEKERJA TERANCAM DALAM PERKIRAAN UNDANG-UNDANG MENGIKUT STANDARD MINIMUM PEMBURUHAN MALAYSIA Zulkifly Osman
- 37. CONSULTATION-BASED BUSINESS LEARNING: THE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
  Ahmad Raflis Che Omar, Suraiya Ishak, Zaimah Darawi, Jumaat Abd. Moen
- 38. THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LINKAGES ON THE MALAYSIAN ECONOMY

Noorasiah Sulaiman & Ahmad Fikri Mohd Fauzi

- 39. CAREER DEVELOPMENT ON REGIONAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFICIALS (COMPARATIVE STUDY ON GENERAL HOSPITAL DR. M. YUNUS BENGKULU AND PT. BANK BENGKULU)
  Slamet Widodo, Fahrudin JS Pareke, Berto Usman
- 40. DISPARITY, CONVERGENCE, AND DETERMINANT OF REGIONAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN INDONESIA

Aisyah Fitri Yuniasih, Muhammad Firdaus, Idqan Fahmi

# SUB THEME KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT INNOVATION

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: KENANGA TIME: 14.45-16.00 PM

# MODERATOR Dr. Ir. Suharno, MADev

- 41. THE EFFECT OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GOING CONCERN OPI Suwandi Ng, Sam Ronald
- 42. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDY OF INDONESIAN CONSUMER
  Maryono, Jun-Yen Lee
- 43. ANALYSIS OF SPATIAL CONSENTRATION AND AGGLOMERATION FACTOR OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN WESTERN REGION OF INDONESIA Meilani Putri, Wiwiek Rindayati
- 44. EXAMINATION OF USE BEHAVIOUR OF ACADEMIC INFORMATION SYSTEM IN UNIVERSITY OF BENGKULU USING UAUT (UNIFIED THEORY OF ACCEPTANCE AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY) APPROACH Effed Darta and Muhamad Abduh
- 45. SUPERVISORY BOARD AND AUDIT QUALITY POST REVISED CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF INDONESIA'S LISTED COMPANIES

  Zaitul



# SUB THEME CONSUMER BEHAVIOR

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: KENANGA TIME: 16.30-18.00 PM

# MODERATOR **Dr. Mukhamad Najib**

- 46. THE INFLUENCE OF AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT, NORMATIVE COMMITMENT AND CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT ON CUSTOMER LOYALTY OF PT. BANK KALBAR IN WEST KALIMANTAN Nur Afifah
- 47. USING BENEVOLENCE VENDOR TO CREATE CONSUMER TRUST AT BUSINESS E -RETAILING
  Seprianti Eka Putri
- 48. DISCRIMINATING FACTORS BETWEEN LIGHT USERS AND HEAVY USERS OF SAVING ACCOUNT CUSTOMERS IN BENGKULU CITY Roosemarina A. Rambe
- 49. PERCEIVED VALUE: CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR UPSCALE HOTEL Levyda, Dwi Kartini, Faisal Afiff, Popy Rufaidah
- 50. THE EFFECT OF THE QUALITY OF TOURISM PRODUCTS AND THE BRAND IMAGE OF TOURISM ON THE IMAGE OF BANDA ACEH AS A TOURISM CITY (A study based on marketing approach)

  Hafasnuddin
- 51. THE EFFECT OF COUNTRY OF DESIGN AND COUNTRY OF PRODUCT MANUFACTURING ON PERCEIVED QUALITY WITH INVOLVEMENT AS MODERATING VARIABLE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY Rindang Matoati, Suci Paramitasari Syahlani, Fachri Eka Saputra



# SUB THEME SHARIA ECONOMIC AND FINANCE

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: CEMPAKA TIME: 16.30-18.00 PM

# MODERATOR Dr. Ir. Lukman M. Baga, MEc

- 52. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM SCHOLARS ON THE THEORIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
  - Tubagus Thresna Irijanto, Mohd. Azlan Shah Zaidi, Abdul Ghafar Ismail
- 53. THE APPLICABILITY OF ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW IN ACTIVATING IDLE AGRICULTURAL LAND IN MALAYSIA
  Muhammad Hakimi Bin Mohd Shafiai
- 54. PREDICTION MODEL OF ZAKAH MAAL COMPLIANCE Imron Rosyadi
- 55. ISLAMIC DISCRETIONARY FUNDS AND CONVENTIONAL DISCRETIONARY FUNDS
  - Sulaeman Rahman Nidar, Isnaeni Zulkarnaen
- 56. KEBERKESANAN DAN KESESUAIAN MEDIUM PROMOSI AGIHAN ZAKAT: KAJIAN KES DI NEGERI SELANGOR Hairunnizam Wahid, Sanep Ahmad



# SUB THEME AGRIBUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: MELATI TIME: 16.30-18.00 PM

# MODERATOR Dr. Andriyono Kilat Adhi

- 57. THE IMPACTS OF INCREASING SOYBEAN PRICE ON TEMPEH INDUSTRIES PERFORMANCE AT CITEUREUP VILLAGE, BOGOR Tita Nursiah, Nunung Kusnadi
- 58. TRANSFORMING ENTREPRENEURS INTO SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS: THE CASE OF TURKEY
  Mohammed Zain Bin Yusof, Ibnor Azli Bin Ibrahim, Mohamad Abdul Hamid
- 59. CIRI-CIRI KEUSAHAWANAN DAN KEJAYAAN USAHAWAN DI KELANTAN DAN SELANGOR Suhaila Abdul Kadir, Maisarah Ahmad
- 60. COMPETITIVENESS OF INDONESIAN SWEET POTATOES IN INTERNATIONAL MARKET
  Netti Tinaprilla, Riana Ayu Wulandari
- 61. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOAL ATTAINMENT AND INTENTION TO REMAIN IN A FRANCHISE SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA: A DISCOVERY OF ENTREPRENEUR'S GOAL ATTAINMENT THEORY

  Mohd Hizam Hanafiah
- 62. THE STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL INTENTION AMONG ECONOMIC STUDENTS

  Mumuh Mulyana and Yulia Nurendah

#### GRADUATE STUDENT FORUM

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9th 2013

ROOM: MAWAR TIME: 16.30-18.00 PM

# MODERATOR

Dr. Sahara

63. ARE WE READY TO STRENGTHENING THE SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY? A CASE STUDY IN PORT KLANG

Najmi bin Mohd Radzi, Azman Ismail

64. DOES SOCIAL CAPITAL INFLUENCE EMPOWERMENT? EVIDENCE FROM PASSION FRUIT FARMERS

Kustoro Budiarta, Thamrin, Andri Zainal

65. WHY DON'T WE IMPLEMENT THE 'GETTING PRICE RIGHT' FOR HORTICULTURE AND BEEF COMMODITY PRICE? (AN IDEA FOR FOOD PRODUCTS PRICE ACT)

Dina Nurul Fitria, Harianto

66. THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR MANUFACTURING COMPANIES

Lukluk Fuadah

67. OPTIMIZATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL ANALYSIS IN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS HIGHLANDS VEGETABLES SUPPLY CHAIN IN AGAM REGENCY, WEST SUMATRA

Yuviani Kusumawardhani, Alim Setiawan, Lindawati Kartika, M Syamsun, Anggraini Sukmawati

68. THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLES IN IMPROVING FARMER'S CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE SYSTEM OF INTEGRATED FARMING IN GAPOKTAN SILIH ASIH, WEST JAVA

Diana Lestari Ningsih, Amzul Rifin

# SUB THEME ECONOMIC AND TRADE

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10th 2013

ROOM: KENANGA TIME: 08.00-10.00 AM

# MODERATOR **Dr. Aceng Hidayat**

- 69. A STUDY OF SUMATRA CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT TO IMPLEMENT "MASTERPLAN FOR ACCELERATION AND EXPANSION OF INDONESIA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" AND AFTA 2015

  Ma'mun Sarma, Sugeng Budiharsono, Ahmad Yani
- 70. THE IMPACT OF ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC) ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

  Darma Rika Swaramarinda, Achmad Fauzi
- 71. THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME AND SAVING ON LABOR SUPPLY OF ELDERLY IN INDONESIA
  Ratu Eva Febriani
- 72. MANAGEMENT OF HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN RURAL POVERTY Ahmad Mardalis, Imron Rosyadi
- 73. AUTONOMOUS EMPOWERMENT MODEL FOR FARMERS TO ACTUALIZE REGIONAL FOOD SECURITY
  Maulidyah Indira Hasmarini, Didit Purnomo, Zainal Arifin
- 74. HONG KONG'S ACCESSION TO ACFTA: WILL IT BENEFITS ASEAN? Jamal Othman
- 75. SURFING THE WAVES OF ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: SPILLOVER EFFECT OF FINANCIAL AND COMMODITY MARKETS AMONG ASEAN COUNTRIES

Hawati Janor, Ruzita Abdul Rahim, Ahmad Raflis, Roslan Jaafar, Ehsan Hossenidoust

76. SENSE-MAKING IN CONTENT ANALYSIS: A RESEARCH NOTE ON NARRATIVE INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN ANNUAL REPORTS

Mara Ridhuan Che Abdul Rahman, School of Accounting



# SUB THEME SHARIA ECONOMIC AND FINANCE

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10th 2013

ROOM: CEMPAKA TIME: 08.00-10.00 AM

# MODERATOR Dr. Dedi Budiman Hakim

- 77. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ZAKAT DISTRIBUTION ON ASNAF'S SOCIOECONOMICS: MAQASID AL-SYARIAH APPROACH Sanep Ahmad, Hairunizam Wahid, Rosbi Ab Rahman
- 78. TAWARRUQ DEPOSIT WITH WAKALAH PRINCIPLE: AN OPTION THAT TRIGGERS NEW ISSUES
  Abdul Ghafar Ismail, Nik Abdul Rahim Nik Abdul Ghani, Mat Nor Mat Zain
- 79. THE IMPACT OF DISPLACED COMMERCIAL RISK ON FINANCIAL STABILITY IN ISLAMIC BANKING INSTITUTIONS

  Noraziah Che Arshad, Roza Hazli Zakaria, Ahmad Azam Sulaiman @

  Mohamad
- 80. MARKET STRUCTURE, COMPETITIVENESS AND CHALLENGES TO DEVELOP HALAL INDUSTRY IN MALAYSIA
  Mohd Ali Mohd Noor
- 81. THE PERCEPTION OF TAX PAYERS ON TAX KNOWLEDGE AND TAX EDUCATION WITH LEVEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE: A STUDY THE INFLUENCES OF RELIGIOSITY

  Mohd Rizal Palil, Mohd Rusyidi Md Akir, Wan Fadillah Bin Wan Ahmad



# SUB THEME AGRIBUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10th 2013

ROOM: MELATI TIME: 08.00-10.00 AM

# MODERATOR *Dr. Netti Tinaprila*

- 82. AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT AND OBSTACLES OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SMES) IN BENGKULU PROVINCE Muhamad Abduh, Benardin, Effed Darta
- 83. THE IMPACT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUALITY, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON FIRM VALUE AND RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR Triyono
- 84. SUBJECTIVE RISK EXPECTATIONS, RISK ATTITUDE AND INVESTMENT PLAN: THE CASE OF OIL PALM SMALLHOLDERS IN INDONESIA Eko Ruddy Cahyadi
- 85. INFLUENCES OF RISK MANAGEMENT TO FIRM VALUE Ariane Satri Andina, Rini Indriani, Eddy Suranta
- 86. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT OF PAPAYA BY CULTIVATING ON SUB OPTIMAL FIELD IN INDONESIA: A SOLUTION TO FRUIT IMPORT RESTRICTION Anna Fariyanti, M.Firdaus, Yayah K.Wagiono, Heri Harti, Endang Gunawan
- 87. ANALYSIS EDUCATION INEQUALITY AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RIAU PROVINCE Siswiny M.O. Br Tambunan, Sri Mulatsih, Sahara
- 88. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INNOVATION, COMPETITIVENESS, RISK, POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BROILER FARM Burhanuddin, Harianto, Rita Nurmalina, Rachmat Pambudy



#### GRADUATE STUDENT FORUM

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10th 2013

ROOM: MAWAR TIME: 08.00-10.00 AM

# MODERATOR **Dr. Jono M. Munandar**

- 89. FACTORS INFLUENCING E-COMMERCE USE BY MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES OF AGRIBUSINESS IN INDONESIA Fitri, Heny K Daryanto
- 90. ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING Anton Arisman
- 91. AN INNOVATION MODEL IN NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE IN PLANTATION AGRIBUSINESS
  Dina Nurul Fitria, Harianto
- 92. CONSUMER VULNERABILITY IN URBAN AREA Megawati Simanjuntak
- 93. SUPERIOR FARMER COMPETENCE MODEL IN FORMING THE CAPACITY BUILDING OF HIGHLAND VEGETABLE FARMING IN KARO DISTRICT, NORTH SUMATRA

Raysah Yunita Rahma, Alim Setiawan, Lindawati Kartika, M Syamsun, Anggraini Sukmawati

- 94. LEADERSHIP STYLE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: A REVISITING OF JOB SATISFACTIONS DETERMINANT Zulkarnain Siregar, Ramadhan Putra M. Noor

95. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN INDONESIA Hery Ferdinan

- 96. ANALYSIS OF THE LEADING SECTORS AND THE FACTORS INFLUENCING EMPLOYMENT IN EAST KALIMANTAN Farah Meiska Wijaya, Yeti Lis Purnamadewi
- 97. FAMILY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A SOLUTION TO FACE THE CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC HARDSHIP OF INDONESIA Megawati Simanjuntak



## STEERING COMMITTEES

#### Dean of Faculty of Economics and Management IPB

Dr. Yusman Syaukat

#### **MIICEMA Coordinator**

Prof. Dr. Nor Ghani Md Nor (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia)

# Dean and Departmental Chair Forum of the State University Council of the Western Indonesia Region Coordinator

Dr. Ridwan Nurazi (University of Bengkulu)

#### ORGANIZING COMMITTEES

#### Advisor

Muhammad Firdaus -Vice Dean FEM IPB

#### Chairman

Anggraini Sukmawati

#### Vice Chairman

Burhanuddin

#### Secretary

Anna Fariyanti, Lindawati Kartika

#### **Tresurer**

Yusuf

#### **Programme**

Yeti Lis Purnamadewi, Faroby Falatehan Yanti Nuraeni Muflikh, Kastana Fauzan Z, Eka Puspitawati, Feryanto WK Nurhadi, Mahasiswa Himpro

#### Paper & Proceeding

Amzul Rifin, Mohammad Najib, Netti Tinaprila Sahara, Nuva, Syaefuddin, Denny Lubis

#### **Logistics & Transport**

Hastuti

Maryono, Bambang Kuntadi Mahasiswa Himpro

#### PR & Exhibit

Mulyadi Rio, Deddy C. Sutarman Benny Osta Nababan, Alim setiawan

#### Catering

Hardiana, Dewi Sari Saraswati

#### **Equipment**

Suryadi

Staf Dekanat FEM IPB

#### The 14th MIICEMA 2013 Secretariat

Faculty of Economics and Management, Bogor Agricultural University (IPB)
Dekanat FEM Jl. Kamper, Kampus IPB Darmaga, Bogor 16680 Indonesia

Email: miicema2013@gmail.com; Phone: +62 251 8626520, Fax: +62 251 8626631, http://fem.ipb.ac.id/miicema

# Supervisory Board and Audit Quality Post Revised Code of Corporate Governance: The Case of Indonesia Listed Companies

#### **ZAITUL**

Senior Lecturer in Accounting Department Faculty of Economic, University of Bung Hatta Jl. Sumatra, Ulak Karang Padang Sumatra Barat, Indonesia 25133

Phone: +62751 7051678 Fax: +62751 7055475 <u>zaitula@yahoo.co.uk</u>

#### Abstract

Indonesia is a unique of corporate governance system. Even, Indonesia follow the Europe Continental Corporate Governance System, the appointment and dismissal of supervisory board is different compare to the common practice in Continental Europe countries, such as Nederland. Code of Corporate governance is code of conduct that should be followed by the company in order to be perceived as having been practiced the principle of corporate governance. In Indonesia, code of corporate governance has been revised in 2006. However, there is a limited study conducted post this revision in Indonesia, especially its effect in audit quality. Therefore, this study intent to investigate the effect of the supervisory board on audit quality. By using 218 companies for three years, we find that supervisory board size and age have a positively significant relationship with the audit quality as predicted by resources dependent theory. In addition, profitable, higher financial risk and large companies tend to select the higher quality of audit firm. However, this finding fail to confirm the agency theory. The finding of this study have a number of an important implication for future practice, such as the mechanism of selecting and dismissing supervisory board independent.

Keyword; Corporate Governance, Supervisory Board, Audit Quality and Indonesia listed companies.

#### 1. **Introduction**

The role of corporate governance in financial reporting quality has been debated over the decade. Supervisory board is one of the internal mechanisms to limit the discretionary behavior of the management and enhance the financial information quality. In addition, this condition led to the investor confidence to invest a particular company. Therefore, the good practice of corporate governance is an essential in a company. Indonesia started implementing the principle of corporate governance in the beginning of the year 2000. It was marked by establishing the forum for corporate governance and it released the code of corporate governance in early year of 2000.

There are two type of corporate governance system: Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance and Continental Europe System. The later system has the two-tier board system (Supervisory Board and Management Board). Indonesia follows the Continental Europe System and the way supervisory board is appointed and dismissed, however, differ compared to the original system. The role of supervisory board as internal corporate governance mechanism in financial reporting quality has been suggested by Cohen et al (2004). In addition, many researchers have documented the significant effect of the existence of supervisory board on financial reporting quality (see for example, Osma, 2008; and Osma & Noguer, 2007).

To get the higher quality of financial report, the supervisory board and management have to select the higher quality of external auditor or audit firm. This term is well known as the audit quality. The issue of audit quality is at the heart of the agency theory and corporate governance since the demand for the external auditor is to reduce the opportunistic behavior of management and agency conflict, and protect the shareholder interest by ensuring the relevance and reliability of financial statement (Gana & Lajmi, 2011). Audit quality is the probability that the auditor discover the material misstatement and report in the company accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981b). Therefore, the higher audit quality increase the chance to detect any material misstatement in the financial report and the shareholder can gain access to information that is more useful (Wan-Abdullah, Ismail & Jamalludin, 2008).

The research that investigates the relationship between board characteristics and audit quality has been largely done. However, most of studies are conducted in Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance System, such as US and UK (see for example, O'Sullivan, 2000; Beasly

&Petroni, 2001; Carsello, Hermanson, Neal & Riley, 2002; and Boo & Sharma, 2008). In emerging market, investigation on audit quality has also been done in Egypt (Suliman & Abd-Salem, 2012), Malaysia (Wan-Abdullah, Ismail & Jamaluddin, 2008), Tunisia (Makni, Kolsi & Affes, 2012) and among others. However, study in Continental Europe Corporate governance system is still limited as far as we concern (such as study was conducted in France, Germany and Canada by Piot (2005)). In addition, there is also lack of study has been done by using the supervisory board as determinants of the audit quality in Indonesia. Further, Indonesia has been revised the code of corporate governance in 2006. Besides, Indonesia government very much concern with the financial accounting information quality and it is evidenced by implementing the financial accounting standard that complied with the IFRS in early 2012. This condition may enrich the corporate governance and audit quality literature. Thus, this study aims to investigate the relationship between supervisory board characteristic and audit quality post revised code of corporate governance. Supervisory board characteristics in this study consists of the composition, size, shareholding, knowledge and expertise, and experiences.

### 2. Theoretical foundation and hypothesis development

The role of Supervisory Board lies in the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, Supervisory Board has function to reduce the dysfunctional behavior and therefore, agency problem and cost. In term of accounting quality, Supervisory Board can oversee the financial reporting process (Cohen et. al, 2004). Supervisory board (also known as board of commissioner) is an organ of the company that have function and responsible collectively for overseeing and providing advices to the Board of Directors and ensuring that company implement the corporate governance principles (NCG, 2006). In addition, NGC (2006) emphases on the several characteristics of supervisory in order to be able to effectively exercise their duties, (i) the composition of the board of supervisory board shall enable them to make effective, right and timely decision and to act independently, (ii) the members of the Supervisory Board must be professional that possess the integrity and capability to enable them to carry out their function properly including to ensure that the Board of Director shall observe the interest of all stakeholders, and (iii) the oversight and advisory function of the Supervisory Board include the act of preventing, improvement, and suspension.

#### 2.1. Supervisory Board Composition

Composition of Supervisory Board refers to the ratio of the supervisory board from outside to total board members. Outside Supervisory Board is also known as the supervisory board independence. Supervisory board independence has a particular incentive to prevent and detect the opportunistic reporting behavior by management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liabilities, and promote the shareholder interests, a more independent supervisory board may demand differently higher audit quality which is greater assurance (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley, 2002). In addition, Carcello et al (2002) find that there is a positive relationship between board independence and audit quality. Further, Soliman and Abdul-Elsalam (2012) also documented the positive significant relationship between Board Independent and audit quality in Egyptian company. Other study done by using the Belgium public company also concludes the positive relationship between board independent and audit quality (Gana and Lajmi, 2011). Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follow

H1: There is a significant positive relationship between supervisory board composition and audit quality

#### 2.2. Supervisory Board Size

Supervisory board size refers to the number of supervisory board in a company. There are two arguments regarding to the board size. Jensen (1993) consider that large number of board would bring to the inefficient monitoring due to the communication and decision making process problem. In contrast, Pearce and Zahra (1992) state that large number of board increase the board performance due to the ability of board to bring the external resources into company. In addition, Gana and Lajmi (2012) find that a positive significant relationship between board size and audit quality. However, Krishnan and Visvananthan (2009) investigate the relationship between board size and audit quality, and thus, conclude that there is no significant effect of the board size and audit quality. Based on the theoretical reason and previous study, we offer the second hypothesis. *H2: There is a significant positive relationship between supervisory board size and audit quality.* 

#### 2.3. Supervisory Board Shareholding

Supervisory board shareholding refers to board owning the company share. The contention of the board shareholding come from Jensen and Meckling (1976). They argue that

board should have small portion of stock in order to reduce gap between the interest of board and shareholder interests. Therefore, there is alignment between board and shareholder. In addition, Monk and Minow (1995) argue that the role of board become effective, it is not just because they have economic ties with the company, but also they are shareholders. Therefore, supervisory board with share would choose the high quality of external auditor because the high quality external auditor contribute to the high quality of accounting information. Thus, the next hypothesis is as follow,

H3: There is a significant positive relationship between supervisory board shareholding and audit quality.

#### 2.4. Supervisory Board Knowledge and Expertise

The role of supervisory board knowledge and expetice in financial reporting process come from the resources dependent theory. This theory views that knowledge and expertice is often conceptuaized as stock of information or background expertice that board member have (Payne, Benson, and Finegold, 2009). Sonnefelt (2002) classified the knowledge as business strategy, finance, Law, Governance, technology and society. In fact, Ravasi and Zattoni (2006) argue that baord member should have functional knowledge, such as accounting, finance and marketing. In addition, Rindova (1999) suggest that board member should have expetice in form of problem solving, communication and team work. Therefore, supervisory board with knowledge and expertice would select the higher quality of external auditor. Thus, the following hyphtesis offer

H4: There is a significant relationship between supervisory board knowledge and expertise and audit quality.

#### 2.5. Supervisory Board experience

Supervisory board experience is another determinants of the audit quality (Gana and Lajmi, 2011). In addition, Board experience might further involve themselves in the promotion of company advantage (Kroll, Walters, and Wright, 2008). In line with Kroll et al (2008), Daya, Lonie and Power (1996) add that board experience would help in making information more transparence. Further, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) argue that board of director experience is more likely to have greater incentives to monitor effectively and safeguard their reputation. Thus, supervisory board would prefer to choose the higher quality of external auditor to safe their

reputation. Abdelsalam and Street (2007) classify the board experience into three proxy, which are age, directorship and tenure. Previous research conducted by Gana and Lajmi (2011) conclude that there is significant relationship between board experience and audit quality. Therefore, the next hypothesis is as follow,

H5: there is a significant relationship between supervisory board experience and audit quality.

#### 3. Sample, data and model

We use the public listed company as object of this study. Based on the availability of data, we get the 218 companies (44.9% of total population). However, we utilize the three year data from 2006 to 2008 which come the total number of observation is 654 companies-years. Secondary data is used which are from multiple sources (annual report, Indonesia Capital market Directory, company websites and other sources). Further, there are three type of variables in this study, dependent variable (Audit Quality), independent variables (Supervisory Board Composition, Size, Knowledge and Experience, Shareholding, and Experience). Control variables (ROA, LEV, and SIZE).

Audit quality is a dummy variable which assign 1 if company is audited by a big 4 and otherwise. Supervisory board composition is measured by number of supervisory board independent to total board members. In addition, supervisory board size is total number of supervisory board as proxy. Further, supervisory board knowledge and expertise is measured by the ratio of number of supervisory board has an academic background of business and management to total board members. Thus, supervisory board experience is measured by three proxy, (i) Supervisory board age, (ii) supervisory board multiple directorship, and (iii) supervisory board tenure. Finally, the ROA is net income per total asset and debt to asset ratio is proxy for leverage. SIZE is a company size which measured by total asset. The research model is as follow,

$$AQ_{it} = a + \beta_1 \, BC_{it} + \beta_2 \, BZ_{it} + \beta_3 BS_{it} + \beta_4 \, BEK_{it} + \beta_5 \, BED_{it} + \beta_6 \, BEA_{it} + \beta_7 \, BET_{it} + \beta_8 \, ROA_{it} + \beta_9 \, LEV_{it} + \beta_{10} \, SIZE_{it} + e$$

In this study, we use the panel data analysis with *Logit* model. This model is applied to the typical data of dependent variable that is categorical variable. Therefore, the *Logit* model procedure is applied to this study.

#### 4. Result and Discussion

#### PROCEEDING The 14th Malaysia Indonesia Conference on Economics, Management and Accounting (MIICEMA) 2013

This section discuss about the result of this study. This study finally have the 218 companies as sample. The table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistic

No	Variables	Descriptive Statistic before Outlier Test (n=654)							
		Min	Max	Means	SD				
1	AQ	0	1	0.41	0.49				
2	BC (%)	0	100	41.03	14.71				
3	BZ (person)	1	12	4.33	1.91				
4	BS	0	1	0.16	0.37				
5	BEK (%)	0	100	49.98	24.87				
6	BED (%)	0	100	64.23	28.49				
7	BEA (years)	27.5	82.6	55.35	6.34				
8	BET (years)	0.2	20.5	5.64	3.65				
9	ROA (%)	-130	62.2	3.65	13.19				
10	LEV(%)	0	238	53.31	29.78				
11	SIZE (billion)	0.4	57929	5696.15	12489.51				

Note; AQ is audit quality, BC is Board Composition, BZ is Board Size, BS is Board Shareholding, BEK is Board Expertise & Knowledge, BED is Board Experience (Multiple Directorship), BEA is board experience (Age), BET is Board Experience (Tenure), ROA is return on asset, LEV is debt to asset ratio, and SIZE is company size

We use the regression analysis to reject hypothesis. However, checking for outlier is firstly conducted by using the Grubb test procedure to detect and remedy the outlier data (Grubb, 1969). The result of the outlier test reported in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 Result of Outlier Test

PROCEEDING The 14th Malaysia Indonesia Conference on Economics, Management and Accounting (MIICEMA) 2013

No	Variables	Ou	ıtlier	Descriptive S	tatistic After (	Outlier Reme	dy (n=654)
		# of Obs	%	Min	Max	Means	SD
1	AQ	-	0	0	1	0.41	0.49
2	ВС	7	1.07	0	75	40.69	13.57
3	BZ	2	0.31	1	10	4.32	1.88
4	BS	-	0	0	1	0.16	0.37
5	BEK	0	0	0	100	49.98	24.87
6	BED	0	0	0	100	64.23	28.49
7	BEA	3	0.46	36.3	76	55.36	6.2
8	BET	1	0.15	0.2	19.7	5.64	3.64
9	ROA	5	0.76	-26.1	34	3.46	7.88
10	LEV	1	0.15	0	158	53.11	28.36
11	SIZE	12	1.83	0.4	29706.9	3751.96	6807.35

The next analysis is normality test. We utilize the Kurtosis and Skewness to detect normality. In addition, transformation is applied if variables are not normal. The role of thumb say that Tolerance value of kurtosis and skewness is + 1 and - 1. The result of detection and remedy for normality is presented table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3 Normality Test and Transformation

	Skev	vness	Kur	tosis	Transformation	Skewness		Kurtosis	
Variable	Stat	SE	Stat	SE		Stat	SE	Stat	SE
AQ	0.38	0.1	-1.86	0.19	dummy				
BC	0.35	0.1	0.86	0.19	none needed	0.35	0.1	0.86	0.19
BZ	1.1	0.1	0.91	0.19	Square root	0.63	0.1	-0.02	0.19
BS	3.38	0.1	10.36	0.19	dummy				
BEK	0.04	0.1	-0.3	0.19	none needed	0.04	0.1	-0.3	0.19
BED	-0.53	0.1	-0.34	0.19	none needed	-0.53	0.1	-0.34	0.19
BEA	-0.1	0.1	0.98	0.19	none needed	-0.1	0.1	0.98	0.19
BET	1.36	0.1	2	0.19	Square root	0.527	0.1	0.174	0.19
ROA	0.63	0.1	4.98	0.19	normal score*	-0.01	0.1	-0.19	0.21
LEV	0.47	0.1	0.96	0.19	none needed	0.47	0.1	0.96	0.19
SIZE	2.77	0.1	7.22	0.19	Logarithma	-0.48	0.1	0.24	0.19

<sup>\*</sup>The data were transformed by computing normal scores using Van der Waerden's transformation defined by the formula r/(w + 1), where w is the sum of the case weight and r is the rank ranging from 1 to w (see Owunsu-Anshah and Levemtis, 2006).

The multicollinearity problem is detected by using the Pearson-Correlation. The result (see table 4.4) show that there is no significant higher correlation among the independent variable and we can conclude that there is no multicollinearity problem in this model.

Table 4.4
Result of Pearson-Correlation

PROCEEDING The 14th Malaysia Indonesia Conference on Economics, Management and Accounting (MIICEMA) 2013

Ind. Var	BC	BZ	BS	BEK	BED	BEA	BET	ROA	LEV	SIZE
BC	1									
BZ	-0.06	1								
BS	-0.07	-0.08	1							
BEK	0.06	-0.00	-0.06	1						
BED	-0.15**	0.12**	-0.02	0.02	1					
BEA	0.03	0.15**	0.05	-0.10**	0.00	1				
BET	-0.09*	-0.13**	0.04	-0.08*	0.02	-0.28**	1			
ROA	-0.00	0.20**	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04	0.10**	-0.01	1		
LEV	0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.06	-0.05	0.09*	-0.01	-0.25**	1	
SIZE	0.04	0.45**	-0.14**	-0.03	-0.02	0.18**	0.03	0.24**	0.09*	1
Notes: two	Notes: two-tailed, * and ** significant at 5% and 1% respectively									

This study use a panel data approach to reject hypotheses and utilize the e-views software. The Hosmer and Lemeshaw test is applied to see the feasibility of model and the result show that that the model is feasible. It is indicated by H-L test of 7.9258 with the significant value of 0.4407 which is greater than 0.05. In addition, it means that no significant difference was found between the classifications of the observed and predicted. To regress data, binary logic model (BLM) use with option of quadratic hill climbing. To describe How far the independent variables could explain the dependent variable use the McFadden R-Square. In addition, McFadden R Square is 0.2159 which means that supervisory board characteristics and control variable could explain the audit quality about 21.59% and the rest is explained by other variables which is excluded in this study.

Table 4.5
Regression Result
(Audit Quality or AQ as Dependent Variable)

PROCEEDING The 14th Malaysia Indonesia Conference on Economics, Management and Accounting (MIICEMA) 2013

No	Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	Z statistic	Probability
1	С	-9.520848	1.257834	-7.569243	0.0000
2	вс	-1.625563	0.727537	-2.234336	0.0255**
3	BZ	1.183916	0.252201	4.694346	0.0000***
4	BS	-0.483055	0.273838	-1.764021	0.0777*
5	BEK	-0.437974	0.38084	-1.150019	0.2501
6	BED	0.091781	0.335271	0.273751	0.7843
7	BEA	0.051295	0.017198	2.982582	0.0029***
8	BET	-0.086951	0.133322	-0.652185	0.5143
9	ROA	0.493815	0.106577	4.633406	0.0000***
10	LEV	0.721507	0.364344	1.980293	0.0477**
11	SIZE	0.751536	0.131605	5.71055	0.0000***

Note: \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5% and \*\*\* significant at 1%

The result of regression is shown in Table 4.5. Surprisingly, the first hypothesis is rejected due to negative direction of the effect supervisory board on audit quality. Thus, it means that supervisory board independence is not likely to select the higher quality audit firm. However, this finding do not support the previous researches, such as Carcello et al (2002), Soliman and Abdul-Elsalam (2012), and Gana and Lajmini (2011). In addition, a possible explanation for this might be that board independence may engulf the company in excessive monitoring (Bayersinger and Butler, 1985) and may lack the business knowledge to be truly effective (Paton and Baker, 1987). In addition, board independent might lack real independent (Demb and Neubeuer, 1992). In Indonesia, supervisory board independents appoint and dismiss by shareholders. Therefore, the shareholder would be select the board that benefit them.

Turning now to the second hypothesis which state that there is a positive relationship between supervisory board size and audit quality. The result indicate that this second hypothesis is accepted. It is encouraging to compare this finding with that found by Gana and lajmi (2012). However, this result differ from Krishnan and Visvananthan (2009) who find that there is no significant relationship between board size and audit quality. This result may be explained that by the fact that large number of supervisory board bring to diverse capability and resources as suggested by resources dependent theory (Pearce and Zhara, 1992). Contradict to the third hypothesis, supervisory board with share is less likely to select the higher quality of audit firm. It indicate by the negative signal of the effect of board shareholding on the audit quality

#### PROCEEDING The 14th Malaysia Indonesia Conference on Economics, Management and Accounting (MIICEMA) 2013

(significant at 10%). The present study do not seem to be consistent with the idea of Monk and Minow (1995) which argue that board with share become effective.

Supervisory board knowledge and expertise does not have a significant effect on the audit quality due to the p value greater than 0.05. The fifth hypothesis is partially accepted. Supervisory board age is positive significantly associated with the audit quality. It means that older supervisory board tends to select the higher audit firm. This finding is consistent with the finding of Gana and Lajmi (2012) who conclude that older supervisory board tend to have experience and therefore, choose the higher audit firm.

Three control variables have a significant relationship with the audit quality. In addition, ROA is proxy for profitability and the result show that profitable company tend to have the higher audit firm. Thus, company with higher debt also tend to select the higher quality audit firm. Further, large company would elect the higher audit firm to audit its financial statement. The reason for this is not clear but it may have something to do with the ability to pay the higher audit fee for big 4 audit firm.

## 5. Conclusion, Implication and Suggestion for future research

Supervisory board is assigned to reduce the management dysfunctional behavior. Regulation framework used to guide the company in a country is code of corporate governance. In Indonesia, Code of Corporate Governance has been revised in 2006. In this revision, the role of supervisory board had been strengthened in order to reduce the agency conflict and improve the accounting information quality and finally, increase the company performance. However, study to investigate the role of supervisory board on audit quality is rare, especially in Indonesia. Such business, system and culture of Indonesia might enrich the literature of corporate governance. In this investigation, the aim was to assess the role of supervisory board on audit quality.

This study have five hypothesizes and use 281 companies listed Indonesia stock exchange from 2006 to 2008 (Post revision Code of Corporate Governance). From the result, we can conclude that supervisory board size and experience have a significant positive relationship with the audit quality. In contrast, supervisory board composition and shareholding are

negatively significant associated with audit quality. However, supervisory board knowledge and expertise, tenure, and multiple directorship do not have any significant relationship with audit quality. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that size and experience of supervisory board determining the audit quality as predicted by resources dependent theory. Whilst this study did not confirm agency theory. The evidence from this study suggest that in order to have the higher quality of audit firm, the number and age of supervisory board should be large and much older.

A number of important limitations need to be considered. First, this study do not considered other variable, such as audit committee as determinant of the audit quality. Second, the study did not classify sample into different industry. And finally, this study use the limited data which is from 2006 to 2008. Therefore, this research has thrown up many question in need of further investigation by searching other variables that might determine the audit quality. Thus, future research also can add the number of sample and data to get the more robust result.

#### Reference

- Abdelsalam, O., & Street, D. L. (2007). Corporate governance and the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by UK listed companies. *Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16*, 111-130.
- Baysinger, B. & Butler, H. (1985). Corporate governance and the board of director: performance effects of changes in board composition, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 1(1), 101-124.
- Beasley, M., & Petroni, K. (2001). Board independence and audit firm type. *Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory*, 20, 97-114
- Boo, E., & Sharma, D. (2008). Effect of regulatory oversight on the association between internal governance characteristics and audit fees. *Accounting and Finance*, 48, 51-71.
- Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., Neal, T. L. and Riley, R. A. (2002). Board Characteristic and Audit Fees, *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 19: 365-384.
- Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. (2004). The Corporate governance mosaic and financial reporting quality. *Journal of Accounting Literature*, 23, 87-152.
- Dahya, H., Lonie, A. A., & Power, D. M. (April 1996). The case for separating the roles of chairman and CEO: An analysis of stock market and accounting data. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 308-321
- DeAngelo, L.E. (1981b). Auditor size and auditor quality. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 3, 183-99.
- Demb, Ada & Neubauer, F., F. (1992). *The corporate board: confronting the paradoxes*, Oxford University Press, New York Oxford.

- Fama, E., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control, *Journal of Law and Economics* 26, 301-325.
- Gana and Lajmi (2011). Directors' board characteristics and audit quality: Evidence from Belgium, *Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing*, 7(7), 668-679.
- Grubb, F. (1969). Procedures for detecting outlying observations in samples, *Tachometric*, 11(1), 1-21.
- Hay, D., Knechel, W. R., & Ling, H. (2008). Evidence on the impact of internal control and corporate governance on audit fees. *International Journal of Auditing*, 12, 9-24.
- Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. *Journal of Finance*, 48, 831-880.
- Jensen, M. C., and, & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, *3*(4), 306-360.
- Kaplan, S. N., & Reishus, D. (1990). Independence NED ships and corporate governance. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 27, 389-410.
- Krishnan, G., & Visvanathan, G. (2009). Do auditors price audit committee's expertise? The case of accounting versus non accounting financial experts. *Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance*, 115-144.
- Kroll, M., Walters, B.A., & Wright, P. (2008). Board vigilance, director experience, and corporate outcomes. *Strategic Management Journal*, 29, 363-382
- Makni, I., Kolsi, M.C., and Affes, H. (2012). The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on audit quality: Evidence from Tunisia, *The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance*, 11(3), 48-70
- Monks, R. & Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Blackwell NCG (2006). Indonesia Code of Good Corporate Governance. Indonesia
- O'Sullivan, N. (2000). The Impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality: Evidence from Large UK Companies, *the British Accounting Review*, 32, 4: 397-414.
- Osma, B. G. & Noguer, B. n. G.-d.-A. (2007). The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: evidence from Spain. *Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15*(6), 1413-1428.
- Osma, B. G. (2008). Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure. *Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16*(2), 116-131.
- Owusu-Ansah, S., & Leventis, S. (2006). Timeliness of corporate annual financial reporting in Greece. *European Accounting Review*, 15(2), 273-287.
- Patton, A., & Baker, J.C. (1987). Why do directors not rock the boat? *Harvard Business Review*, 65, 10-18.
- Payne, G. T., Benson, G. S. & Finegold, D. L. (2009). Corporate attributes, team effectiveness and financial performance. Journal of Management Studies, 46(4), 704-731.
- Pierce, J., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective *Journal of Management Studies*, 29, 411-438.
- Piot, C. (2005). Auditor reputation and model of governance: A comparison of France, Germany and Canada. *International Journal of Auditing*, *9*, 21-44.
- Ravasi, D. and Zattoni, A. (2006). Exploring the political side of board involvement in strategy: a study of mixed-ownership institutions, *The Journal of Management Studies*. 43(8), 1671-704.

#### PROCEEDING The 14th Malaysia Indonesia Conference on Economics, Management and Accounting (MIICEMA) 2013

- Rindova, V.P. (1999). What corporate boards have to do with strategy: a cognitive perspective. The Journal of Management Studies, 36(7), 953-75.
- Salleh, Z., Stewart, J. and Manson, S. (2006). The Impact of Board Composition and Ethnicity on Audit Quality: Evidence from Malaysian Companies, *Malaysian Accounting Review*, 5, 2: 61-83.
- Soliman, M., M, and Abd-Salem (2012). Corporate governance practices and audit quality: An empirical study of the listed companies in Egypt, *World Academy of Science*, *Engineering and technology*, 71, 1292-1297.
- Sonnenfeld, J. A. (2002). What makes great boards great? *Harvard Business Review*, 80, 106–14. Wan-Abdullah, W.Z., Ismail, S., and Jamaluddin, N. (2008). The impact of board composition, ownership and CEO duality on audit quality: the Malaysian evidence, *Malaysian Accounting Reviews*, 7(2), 17-28
- Yatim, Kent, P. and Clarkson, P. (2006). Governance Structure, Ethnicity, and Audit Fees of Malaysian Listed Firms, *Managerial Auditing Journal*, 21, 7: 757-782



# FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT **BOGOR AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY**

# CERTIFICATE

Presented to:

Zaitul

5

Presenter

at

# THE 14th MILCEMA CONFERENCE

Malaysia-Indonesia International Conference on Economics, Management and Accounting

# **ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 2015 ISSUES AND CHALLENGES**

Bogor, Indonesia, October 9 - 10, 2013

Dean,

Authority of the Control of the Co